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Abstract 
Hiring from a pool of workers 
by Azar Abizada and Inácio Bó* 
We consider the hiring of public sector workers through legislated rules and exam-based 
rankings, as is done in many countries and institutions around the world. In them, 
workers take tests and are ranked based on scores in exams and other pre-determined 
criteria, and those who satisfy some eligibility criteria are made available for hiring in a 
“pool of workers.” In each of an ex-ante unknown number of rounds, vacancies are 
announced and workers are then hired from that pool. We show that when the scores are 
the only criterion for selection, the procedure satisfies desired fairness and independence 
properties. We show, with the aid of details of procedures used in Brazil, France and 
Australia, that when compositional objectives are introduced, such as affirmative action 
policies, both the procedures used in the field and in the literature fail to satisfy those 
properties. We then present a new rule, which we show to be the unique rule that satisfies 
those properties. Finally, we show that if multiple institutions hire workers from a single 
pool, even minor consistency requirements are incompatible with compositional 
objectives. 
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1. Introduction
While most companies are free to use almost any criteria to decide which workers
to hire and when, that is not the case in many governments and institutions around
the world. In order to reduce the agency problems of government institutions and
increase the transparency of the hiring process, those institutions have to follow clear
and strict criteria for selecting workers. In particular, when the number of workers hired
is large (such as police officers, tax agents, etc,) the selection procedure may consist
of several steps, such as written exams, physical and psychological tests, interviews,
and so on, which may also be time consuming. Due to the high costs of executing
such selection procedures, these hirings often take place in two phases: the evaluation
phase, in which workers apply for the job and take part in the above-mentioned tests
and exams, and the second phase, in which the institutions select, over time and on a
need basis, workers from the “pool” of workers who took part in the first phase. After
a certain period of time, the pool of workers is renewed, with new ones coming through
a new evaluation phase. As described by the Public Service Commission of the New
South Wales government:
“A talent pool is a group of suitable candidates (whether or not existing
Public Service employees) who have been assessed against capabilities at
certain levels. (...) Using a talent pool enables you to source a candi-
date without advertising every time a vacancy occurs. You can either
directly appoint from the pool without further assessment (for example,
to fill a shorter term vacancy), or conduct a capability-based behavioural
interview with one or more candidates from the pool to ensure a fit with
organizational, team and role requirements (and/or additional assessment
for agency, role specific or specialist requirements – this is recommended
for longer term or ongoing vacancy). This considerably reduces the time
and costs associated with advertising.”1
The main characteristics of these procedures, which will be essential to our analysis, are
that (i) the selection of workers to hire, at any time, follows a well-defined rule, which is
a systematic way of selecting workers to fill a specified number of positions, (ii) workers
are hired in rounds, on a need-basis, and must be selected from the pool of workers who
took part in the evaluation phase, and (iii) the institutions do not necessarily know
ex-ante the number of workers that they will hire during the period of validity of the
pool. Therefore, in general, not all workers in the pool will be hired. This aspect is
emphasized in the description of the selection process used for all personnel hiring in
the European Union institutions:
1Source: Public Service Commission of the New South Wales
(http://www.psc.nsw.gov.au/employmentportal/recruitment/recruitment/guide/planning/talent-
pools)
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“The list is then sent to the EU institutions, which are responsible for
recruiting successful candidates from the list. Being included on a
reserve list does not mean you have any right or guarantee of
recruitment.” [emphasis from original article][9]
Very often, the rules used for hiring workers involve scores in the selection process.
This is not uncommon: the criteria that is used mostly consists of a weighted average
of performance points in multiple dimensions, such as written exam results, education
level, etc.2 When the workers’ scores constitutes the sole element for determining which
workers to hire, a very natural rule, namely sequential priority, is commonly used: if q
workers are to be hired, hire the q workers with the highest scores among those in the
pool. This rule is simple but has many desirable characteristics. First, it is fair in the
sense that every worker who is not (yet) hired has a lower score than those who were
hired. This adds a strong element of transparency to the process: if the worker can
see, as is often the case, the scores of those who were hired (or at least the lowest score
among those who were hired), then she has a clear understanding of why she was not
hired. Secondly, it responds to the agency problem: an institution cannot arbitrarily
select low-scoring workers before selecting all the ones who have a score higher than
that worker. Finally, the quality and identity of the selected workers does not depend
on the number of rounds and vacancies in each round. That is, selecting 20 workers
in four rounds with five workers in each results in selecting the same workers as if 20
workers were selected at once. We denote this property by aggregation independence.
One implication of this requirement is that the set of selected workers is independent of
the number of rounds and vacancies in each round: selecting 10 workers in two rounds
of five workers in each results in the same selection as selecting two workers in each of
five rounds.
While sequential priority satisfies those desirable properties, the criteria used for
hiring workers often combine scores with other compositional objectives. In section 4
we evaluate rules that are used in real-life applications in different parts of the world,
which combine scores with additional objectives. These include “quotas” for individuals
with physical or mental disabilities in public sector jobs in France, for black workers
in public sector workers in Brazil, as well as the gender balanced hiring of firefighters
in the Australian province of New South Wales. We also consider a natural extension
of the use of minority reserves, a procedure introduced in the literature of matching
with distributional objectives. We show that all of these fail most of the time to satisfy
natural concepts of fairness and aggregation independence. These problems are in part
explained in section 5, where we show that a new rule that we propose is the unique rule
2Real-life examples of selection rules based on the ranking of workers are the selection of policemen in
Berlin and public sector workers in Brazil and France.
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that satisfies the concept of fairness adapted to the compositional objectives considered
and is aggregation independent.
In section 6 we consider the cases where there are multiple institutions (or locations,
departments, etc.) hiring from a single pool of workers. While this scenario is very
common, our main result shows that a very mild requirement, saying that the order in
which firms hire workers should not change whether a worker is hired by some of the
institutions, essentially leaves us with a single rule, which says that all institutions must
hire workers following a single common priority over them. As a result, no compositional
objectives are possible in these scenarios.
Other than the sections described above, the rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In section 2 we introduce the basic model of hiring by rules and justify the desirability
of aggregation independence. In section 3 we restrict our focus for rules that are based
on scores associated with each worker, and in section 7 we conclude. Proofs and formal
descriptions of the rules absent from the main text are found in the appendix.
1.1. Related literature. The structure and functioning of the hiring process for public
sector workers has many elements that makes it a clear target for market design: salaries
and terms of employment are often not negotiable, the criteria for deciding who should
be hired are exogenously given (or “designed”) and there is a clear concern with issues
of fairness and transparency. This paper is, to the extent of our knowledge, the first to
evaluate from a theoretical perspective this type of hiring that takes place in the public
sector, in which workers are sequentially hired following a pre-determined criterion.
There are a few branches of the literature, however, that are related to our analysis.
First, the description and analysis of methods for hiring public sector workers around
the world, and the incentives involved. [12] evaluates to what extent the use of ex-
aminations constitute a meritocratic method for recruiting in the public sector. The
author observes that exams may not be the most adequate way to identify fitness for
each function, but that the patronage risk that is involved when using more subjective
criteria such as interviews and CV screening often overcomes those losses. In fact, in
an empirical analysis in different ministries in the Brazilian federal government, [6] find
a positive relation between corruption cases and the proportion of employees hired by
using subjective criteria.
The property of aggregation independence, that we propose is important for this
problem, is somewhat related to notions of consistency [14, 13, 15]. Loosely speaking,
an allocation rule is consistent if whenever agents leave the problem with their own
allocations, the solution of the residual problem makes the same allocation among the
remaining agents. Aggregation independence, on the other hand, says that the order
(or timing) in which the allocation of a given number of jobs take place does not change
the identity of those who will get the jobs. Different notions of consistency have been
used in other matching and allocation problems based on priorities as well [8, 11].
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Finally, a big part of our analysis concerns what we denote compositional objectives,
that is, objectives regarding characteristics that some portions of the workers hired
should have, such as minimum proportions of workers with disabilities, from ethnic mi-
norities or from certain genders. A number of papers have recently tackled these issues
from a market design perspective in school choice [2, 10, 7, 5] and college admissions
[1, 4].
2. Hiring by rules and aggregation independence
A rule determines which workers an institution should hire, given a number of work-
ers to hire, a pool of workers and, potentially, the workers that the institution hired
before. Each time an institution attempts to hire workers from the pool is denoted a
round.
Let A be the set of workers hired in previous rounds, and W be the pool of workers
available. For each (W,A, q), a rule ϕ determines which q workers from W should be
hired. That is, ϕ (W,A, q) ⊆ W and |ϕ (W,A, q)| = min {q, |W |}. For simplicity of
notation, we will sometimes use the following shorthand:
ϕ (W,A, {q1, . . . , qt}) ≡ ϕ
(
W 0, A0, q1
) ∪ ϕ (W 1, A1, q2) ∪ · · · ∪ ϕ (W t−1, At−1, qt)
Where A0 = ∅, W 0 = W and for i > 0, Ai = Ai−1 ∪ ϕ (W i−1, Ai−1, qi) and W i =
W\Ai. Also for simplicity, we will use the shorter notation ϕ (W, q) when A = ∅. Unless
stated explicitly, none of our results rely on situations in which there are not enough
workers, either in general or with some characteristics, to be hired. That is, in all of
our results we will assume that the number of workers in W is at least as large as
∑
qi
, and the same holds for the cases that we will evaluate in which some workers belong
to minority groups.
One crucial property of the process of hiring by rules is that the sequence of hires
(q1, . . . , qt) is ex-ante unknown. That is, every round may or may not be the last
one. The total number of workers who will be hired is also unknown. Therefore, the
properties that we will deem as desirable should hold at any point in time. In this
context, a critical property that a rule should satisfy is aggregation independence.
A rule is aggregation independent if the total set of workers hired after a certain number
of rounds does not depend on how these hires are distributed among rounds.
Definition 1. A rule ϕ is aggregation independent if for any q ≥ q1 ≥ 0 and sets
of workers W and A, ϕ (W,A, q) = ϕ (W,A, {q1, q − q1}).
Therefore, when the rule being used is aggregation independent, an institution that
hires q1 workers in the first round and q2 in the second will select the same workers that
it would by hiring q1 + q2 in a single round. In fact, one can easily check that if a rule is
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aggregation independent, this extends to any combination of rounds: if
∑
i q
a
i =
∑
j q
b
j ,
a sequence of hires qa1 , . . . , qan will select the same workers as qb1, . . . , qbm.
We now provide three reasons to justify aggregation independence as a strongly
desired property for rules for hiring by rules: transparency, non-manipulability, and
robustness.
Transparency
One of the main reasons driving governments and institutions to use hiring by rules
is that, for those who are not hired, the reason why is made clearly and simply. Take,
for example, the rule that consists of always hiring the workers with the highest scores
in an exam. By knowing the rule and observing the workers who were hired (and their
scores), any worker who was not hired knows that there was no obscure reason why she
was not yet hired: it is simply because her score was lower than all those who were in
fact hired.
Suppose, however, that the rule that is used is not aggregation independent. Then,
a worker who was not hired, by just looking at the set of workers who were hired, may
not be able to easily understand why she was not hired, even understanding the rule
that was used, because it would also be necessary for her to know the precise sequence
of number of workers that were hired in each round.
Non-manipulability
While many times the rules which govern the hiring process are chosen in a way that
reduces the ability of managers to make arbitrary choices of whom to hire, they may
have freedom in choosing the sequence of hires. For example, instead of hiring four
workers in one month, she may choose to hire two workers first and then two additional
workers.
If the rule that is used is aggregation independent, different choices of sequences of
workers hired will not lead to different sets of workers hired. If the rule is not aggregation
independent, however, that may not be the case, and a manager may choose a specific
sequence of hiring decisions, which will allow a certain worker to be hired, whereas she
would not be, absent the specific sequence chosen. An aggregation independent rule,
by definition, is not manipulable by the choice of sequence of hires.
Robustness
The third reason why aggregation independence is a desirable property is that the
degree to which the set of workers hired satisfies the objectives represented in the rule is
robust to uncertainty or bad planning on the part of the manager in terms of the number
of workers that are needed. In other words, assuming that the criterion for choosing
workers which is set by the rule represents the desirability of the workers it chooses
(for example, it chooses the most qualified set of workers subject to some constraint),
an aggregation independent rule will always choose the best set of workers, whether
the manager makes hiring decisions all at once or constantly re-evaluates the number of
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workers to be hired. Aggregation independent rules do not have that problem: managers
may hire workers based on demand, and that will not result in a less desirable set of
workers hired.
In section 4.4 we show specific examples of how aggregation independence relates to
non-manipulability and robustness.
3. Score-based rules
A common way in which workers are selected when hiring by rules is through a
scoring of all workers. Using criteria such as written exams, evaluation of diplomas,
certificates and experience, workers receive a score (or number of points). These scores
become the deciding factor of who to hire: when hiring q workers, hire the q workers
with the highest scores from the pool. For a set of workers W , let sW = (sw)w∈W be
the score profile of workers in W .3 A natural property for a score-based rule is for it to
be fair. That is, after any number of rounds, if a worker w was hired and w′ was not,
then sw > sw′ .
Definition 2. A rule ϕ is fair if for anyW , A and {q1, . . . , qt}, w ∈ ϕ (W,A, {q1, . . . , qt})
and w′ 6∈ ϕ (W,A, {q1, . . . , qt}) implies that sw > sw′ .
A natural rule for these kinds of problems is what we denote by sequential priority.
When hiring q workers, it consists of selecting the q workers with the highest score from
the pool of workers. If the pool contains less than q workers, then hire all of them. The
following remark comes immediately from the definition of the rule.
Remark 1. The sequential priority rule is aggregation independent and fair.
When the selection of workers is based on scores, which is a very common setup, the
sequential priority rule gives us all we need: it is fair and aggregation independent.
4. Compositional objectives
It is common for the hiring processes based on rules to combine the use of scores
with compositional objectives, such as affirmative action. Typically, the objective is
to reserve some of the jobs for workers with a certain characteristic, sometimes those
belonging to an ethnic minority or those who possess some type of disability. Denote by
M the set of workers who belong to the minority group (that is, M ⊆ W ) and m (W ′)
be the number of minorities in W ′. The affirmative action policy also has a minority
ratio m, where 0 ≤ m ≤ 1, which represents the proportion of hires that should be
based on the affirmative action.
3Although W is a set, for simplicity of notation we will consider sW following the order in which the
elements of W are written. For example, if we denote W = {w2, w1, w3} , sW = (10, 20, 30) implies
that worker w2 has a score of 10.
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As argued in section 2, the desirable properties associated with affirmative action
should also hold after any number of rounds. Our first requirement is that, when
possible, the proportion of selected minorities should be at least m after each round.
Definition 3. A rule ϕ respects minority rights if, for any W and sequence of hires
{q1, . . . , qt}, (i) when |M | ≥ m×
∑t
i=1 qi we havem (ϕ (W, {q1, . . . , qt})) / |ϕ (W, {q1, . . . , qt})| ≥
m, or (ii) when |M | < m×∑ti=1 qi we have M ⊂ ϕ (W, {q1, . . . , qt}).
Remark 2. The sequential priority rule does not respect minority rights. In general,
fairness is incompatible with respecting minority rights.4
Therefore, we define a weaker notion of fairness, which takes into account the minority
restriction. A rule is minority fair if, conditional on respecting minority rights, the hiring
decision is made based on scores.
Definition 4. A rule ϕ is minority fair if, for anyW ,M ⊆ W and {q1, . . . , qt}, where
H = ϕ (W, {q1, . . . , qt}):
(i) for each w,w′ ∈ W \M or w,w′ ∈M , if w ∈ H and w′ /∈ H, then sw > sw′ ,
(ii) for each w ∈ W \M and w′ ∈M , if sw < sw′ and w ∈ H, then w′ ∈ H,
(iii) if there is w ∈ W \M and w′ ∈ M with sw > sw′ , w /∈ H and w′ ∈ H, then
m (H) / |H| ≤ m.
In words, a rule is minority fair if it (i) chooses between workers from the same group
(minorities or non-minorities) based on their scores, (ii) does not hire low-scoring non-
minorities while higher-scoring minorities are available, and (iii) only hires low-scoring
minorities over higher-scoring non-minorities when that is necessary to bring the ratio
of minorities closer to m from below.
In the following sections we show that differently from rules that are just based on
scores, the design of score-based rules with affirmative action is more challenging. We
present rules currently being used in France, Brazil, and Australia, and show that they
suffer from different issues. We also show that minority reserves, a rule with good
properties in a static model, has substantial problems in our setup.
4.1. Public sector workers in France. By law, every vacancy in the French public
sector must be filled through an open competition. When vacancies are announced, a
document explaining deadlines, job specifications, and the criteria that will be used to
rank the applicants is published. Workers who satisfy some stated requirements then
proceed to take writen, oral an/or physical exams. In some cases, diplomas or other
certifications can also be used for evaluating the workers. At the end of this process,
4Assume that there are three workers: one minority (call him K) and two non-minority (L and V),
where the scores are as follows sL > sV > sK . If the rule needs to select two workers and m is 0.3,
then in order to respect minority rights, the rule should select K and L, which is not fair, as fairness
requires L and V to be selected.
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the results that all workers had in these tests are combined, in a predetermined way, to
produce a ranking over all workers. If the number of vacancies announced was q, then
the top q workers are hired. An additional number of workers are put on a “waiting
list.” These workers on the waiting list may be hired if some of the top q workers reject
the job offer or if additional vacancies need to be filled before a new open competition
is set.
The French law also establishes that at least 6% of the vacancies should be filled by
people with physical or mental disabilities. Instead of incorporating the selection of
those workers into the hiring procedure in a unified framework, the institutions instead
open, with an unclear regularity, vacancies exclusive for workers who have those dis-
abilities. The hiring of workers over time continues following the same procedure as the
open positions described above. However, nothing prevents workers with disabilities
from applying for the open positions. In fact, the authorities provide some accommo-
dation for these workers during the selection, such as for example, allowing for extra
time to write down the exams. These are meant as an attempt to make up for some
disadvantages that those workers have with respect to those without disabilities, and
not to give any advantage.
Let W ∗ ⊆ W and M∗ ⊆ M be the set of workers and workers with disabilities
who applied and were hired or put onto the waiting list to the open competitions
and the competitions reserved for the disabled, respectively. Consider the vacancies
announced as (q1, q2, q3, . . . , qr). Since workers with disabilities may also apply to the
open positions, some of them may apply to both positions. We will therefore allow for
the workers with disabilities to make any combination of applications that are possible:
only to vacancies for workers with disabilities, only for the open vacancies, or for both.
That is, M∗ ⊆ W and in general M∗ ∩W ∗ 6= ∅: all disabled workers are in M and
W , and some of them may also be in W ∗. Moreover, since these constitute different
competitions, the scores among the workers with disabilities and between them and the
other workers may be different in both selection processes. Therefore, we denote by
sOw the score obtained by worker w in the open competition and by sDw the score that
worker w obtained in the competition for workers with disabilities.5 The number of
vacancies that are open for workers with disabilities, as well as when they are opened,
is not determined by any law and is mostly done in an ad-hoc manner. In order to
evaluate the consequences of the method used in France in a formal way, however, we
will consider two alternative policies, as follows.6
Policy 1: This policy consists of first hiring the top q1 workers from W ∗ and then
adjusting the number of workers in M∗ hired in later rounds. For example, say that
5The lists sDW and s
O
W are also defined accordingly.
6We have no evidence that any of these policies constitute actual practice by French institutions, but
we believe that they represent the two most natural attempts at satisfying the legal requirements under
the current rules.
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q1 = 100, but only four workers among the top 100 workers in W ∗ (with respect to sOW )
hired have disabilities. Then, considering the objective of hiring at least 6% workers
with disabilities, if q2 = 50, then open six vacancies exclusive for workers inM∗ (selected
with respect to sDW ) and 44 for those in W ∗ (selected with respect to sOW ). As a result,
by the end of the second round at least 10 workers with disabilities, or m× (q1 + q2),7
will be hired.
Policy 2: This policy consists of first hiring m×q1 fromM∗ (selected with respect to
sDW ), (1−m)×q1 workers fromW ∗ (selected with respect to sOW ) and then adjusting the
number of workers in M∗ hired in later rounds. For example, say that q1 = 100. Then
the policy will result in hiring six workers from M∗ and 94 from W ∗ in the first round.
At least 6% of the workers hired would be among those with disability, therefore, but
potentially more. Suppose that eight workers with disabilities were hired in the first
round and that q2 = 50. Then in the second round, two vacancies exclusive for workers
in M∗ would be open, and the remaining 48 would be open for all workers in W ∗.
Whenever necessary, we will refer to the rules defined by policies 1 and 2 by ϕF1 and
ϕF2 . Since under the French assignment rule each worker may have one or two scores,
what constitutes minority fairness is less clear in this context. The example below
shows, however, that policy 2 may lead to outcomes that clearly violate the spirit of
minority fairness.
Example 1. Let W ∗ = {w3, w4, w5} and M∗ = {w1, w2, w3}, with scores sOW =
(50, 40, 30) and sDW = (50, 40, 30) and m = 0.5. If q = 2, then ϕF2 ({W ∗,M∗} , q)
will select {w1, w3}. Worker w2, however, has a disability and a better score than w3
in the competition in which both participated.
Notice that if worker w2 also applied for the open vacancies and in that competition
obtained a score that is also better than the one obtained by w3, she would have been
hired instead of w3. If the relative rankings of the workers in both competitions are
different, more intricate violations of the spirit of minority fairness can also take place.
If we make the (strong) assumptions that all workers with disabilities apply to both
competitions and that the relative ranking between those workers in both competitions
are the same, we are able to obtain a clear distinction between both policies, as shown
below.
Proposition 1. Suppose that M∗ ⊆ W ∗ and that for every w,w′ ∈M∗, sOw > sOw′ ⇐⇒
sDw > s
D
w′. Policy 1 of the French assignment rule does not respect minority rights
and is not aggregation independent. Policy 2 respects minority rights, is aggregation
independent, and minority fair.
7For simplicity, here and in the rest of the main text we will assume that every expression involving
numbers of workers or vacancies are integers. In the appendix we relax that restriction, and show that
none of the results presented depend on that.
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It is important to notice, however, that the result in proposition 1 depends on the
relative rankings of the workers with disabilities being the same in both
competitions, but perhaps most importantly, on workers with disabilities partic-
ipating in both competitions. This is not a minor issue, since these competitions
often involve a significant amount of time and effort.
4.2. Quotas for black public sector job workers in Brazil. The rules for the
hiring of public sector workers in Brazil works essentially in the same way as in France:
vacancies are filled with open competitions that result in scores associated with the
workers, and workers are hired in each period by following their scores in descending
order. Differently from France, however, there is no quota for workers with disabilities,
but instead, since 2014, there are quotas for black workers.
The use of racial and income-based quotas has been increasing significantly in many
areas of the Brazilian public sector and higher education. At least 50% of the seats in
federal universities, for example, are reserved for students who are black, low-income
or studied in a public high-school [3]. Many municipalities also employ quotas for
black workers in jobs that they offer. One of the most significant recent developments,
however, is a law which establishes that 20% of the vacancies offered in each job opening
should give priority to black workers.8
Differently from France, the quotas for black workers are explicitly incorporated into
the hiring process. More specifically, the rule currently used in Brazil (denoted the ϕB
rule) works as follows. Let k be a number that is higher than any expected number of
hires to be made.
Initial step Workers are partitioned into two groups: (i) Top Minority (TM) and (ii)
Others (O). The TM group consists of the highest scoring top dm × ke
workers from M , and O be the top k − dm × ke workers in W\TM .9 Let
TM1 = TM and O1 = O.
Round r ≥ 1 The dm × qre top scoring minority workers from TM r, and the top
q − dm × qe workers from Or are hired. By removing these workers hired
we obtain TM r+1 and Or+1.
For the Brazilian law specifically, m = 0.2. The example below shows that the Brazilian
rule is not minority fair.
Example 2. Let W = {w1, w2, w3, w4}, M = {w1, w2}, and sW = (100, 90, 80, 50).
Let q = 2, m = 0.5 and k = 4. Then TM1 = {w1, w2} and O1 = {w3, w4}. The
Brazilian rule states that, when hiring two workers, the top worker from TM1 and the
8Lei N. 12.990, de 9 de junho de 2014.
9If there are not enough minority workers, the remaining positions are filled with the top non-minority
workers.
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top from O1 should be hired. Therefore, ϕB (W, q) = {w1, w3}. Since w2 /∈ ϕB (W, q)
and sw2 > sw3 , the Brazilian rule is not minority fair.10
Notice that in this example, worker w2, who is part of the minority, has a higher
score than w3, who is not a minority. Worker w3 is hired, while w2 is not. Given that
the affirmative action rules were designed with the intent of increasing the access that
minorities have to these jobs, this type of lack of fairness is especially undesirable, since
if the hiring process was purely merit-based, worker w2 would have been hired.
[3] describe the implementation of affirmative action in the admission to Brazilian
public universities. There, as here, the problems arise from the fact that positions
(in that case seats) and workers are partitioned between those reserved for minorities
and the open positions. Differently from there, however, unfair outcomes may not be
prevented by students even if they strategically manipulate their minority status. In
the example above, even if w2 applied as a non-minority he would not be hired.
Proposition 2. The Brazilian rule is aggregation independent and respects minority
rights. However, it is not minority fair.
4.3. Gender balance in the hiring of firefighters in New South Wales. The
hiring of firefighters in the Australian province of New South Wales attempts to achieve
a gender-balanced workforce by following a simple rule:
“Candidates who have successfully progressed through the recruitment
stages may then be offered a place in the Firefighter Recruitment train-
ing program. Written offers of employment will be made to an equal
number of the most meritorious male and female candidates based on
performance at interview and the other components of the recruitment
process combines.”11
We denote this rule by NSW rule, or ϕNSW . Although not stated explicitly in the
institution’s website, we will assume that if there are not enough individuals from some
gender, the remaining hirings will be made among those candidates available, based on
their scores. Also, to avoid results that rely simply on whether q is odd or even, we
assume that it is always even. The example below shows the problems involved in that
rule:
Example 3. Let W = {w1, w2, w3, w4}, and W F = {w1, w2} and WM = {w3, w4} be
the set of female and male workers, respectively. Suppose that the scores are sW =
10One may conjecture that the scenario above is very unexpected, since the affirmative action law must
have been enacted in response to minority workers not being hired based solely on scores. As shown
in [3], however, this conjecture may be misleading. For example, even if the average score obtained
by minority workers is lower, one can have situations in which the preferences of the higher achieving
minority workers are correlated, leading to the top minority workers in the entire population applying
to a specific job.
11Source: Fire & Rescue NSW (https://www.fire.nsw.gov.au/page.php?id=9126)
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(100, 90, 80, 50). Let q = 2. Then ϕNSW (W, q) = {w1, w3}. Since w2 is not hired but
sw2 > sw3 , the NSW rule is not fair. Moreover, it is easy to see that if either gender is
considered a minority, the rule is also not minority fair.
The result below summarizes the properties of the NSW rule.
Proposition 3. The NSW rule is aggregation independent but not fair. If one of the
genders is deemed as a minority, then it respects minority rights but is not minority
fair.
4.4. Sequential use of minority reserves. Next, we consider what may be a natural
rule to be used. In each period in which there are vacancies to be filled, the institu-
tion uses a choice procedure generated by reserves [10, 7], with a proportion m of the
vacancies reserved for minority workers.
Given a set of workers W , of minorities M ⊆ W , a number of reserved positions qm
and of hires q, a choice generated by reserves consists of hiring the top min {qm, |M |}
workers from M and then filling the remaining q − min {qm, |M |} positions with the
top workers in W still available. In a static setting, this procedure is shown to have
desirable fairness and efficiency properties, while satisfying the distributional objectives
[10]. We denote the sequential use of minority reserves rule by ϕSM .
In our setting, therefore, the sequential use of minority reserves rule consists of, in
round r, hiring qr workers, reserving m× qr of them for minorities.
Proposition 4. The sequential use of minority reserves respects minority rights. How-
ever it is neither minority fair nor aggregation independent.
The next example shows the problems associated with this rule.
Example 4. LetW = {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5},M = {w1, w2, w5}, and sW = (100, 90, 80, 50, 20).
Let r = 2, q1 = q2 = 2 and m = 0.5. In the first round, the top worker from M and
the top from W\ {w1} are hired, that is, {w1, w2}. In the second round, the pools of
remaining workers are W 2 = {w3, w4, w5} and M2 = {w5}. The top worker from M2 ,
that is, {w5}, and the top from W 2\ {w5} are hired. Therefore, {w3, w5} are hired in
the second round and ϕSM (W, {q1, q2}) = {w1, w2, w3, w5}.
Now consider the case where q = q1 + q2 = 4. Then in the first and unique round,
the two top workers from M , {w1, w2}, and the top two workers from W\ {w1, w2} are
hired, that is, {w3, w4}. Therefore, ϕSM (W, q1 + q2) = {w1, w2, w3, w4}. Therefore, the
ϕSM rule is not aggregation independent. Also, note that w4 ∈ ϕSM (W, {q1, q2}), w5 ∈
ϕSM (W, {q1, q2}) and sw4 = 50 > 20 = sw5 whilem
(
ϕSM (W, {q1, q2})
)
/
∣∣ϕSM (W, {q1, q2})∣∣ =
0.75 > 0.5 = m, implying that the ϕSM rule is not minority fair.
The sequential use of minority reserves rule is a good rule for providing examples
of the problems associated with rules that are not aggregation independent. First,
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consider the issue of manipulability. Take example 4 above and suppose that the
manager needs to hire four workers and have a preference for hiring worker w5. If she
hires the four workers that she needs, all at once, w5 would not be hired. If, instead,
she chooses to hire first two workers, and then later two more workers, w5 will be hired.
That is, by choosing a sequence of hires strategically, the manager is able to hire the
person she wanted.
Next, we show that the lack of aggregation independence may lead to the hiring of
a group of workers who are not in line with some common objectives of desirability,
(the issue of robustness, as described in section 2). To see how this can be a problem,
consider the example below:
Example 5. Let W = {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, w8}, M = {w5, w6, w7, w8}, sW =
(100, 90, 80, 70, 60, 50, 40, 30) and m = 0.5.
If workers are hired in four rounds, where q1 = q2 = q3 = q4 = 1, the set of workers
hired will be {w5, w6, w7, w8}. If, on the other hand, workers are hired all at once, with
q1 = 4, the set of workers hired will be {w1, w2, w5, w6}
Assuming that the scores are a good representation of the degree of desirability of a
worker for a task, the example above shows that a lack of planning could lead to hiring
a set of workers that are substantially less qualified.
5. Sequential adjusted minority reserves
Now we present a new rule, sequential adjusted minority reserves, denoted by ϕSA.
It consists of the sequential minority reserves rule in which the number of vacancies
reserved for minorities is adjusted in response to hires made in previous rounds. More
specifically, the rule works as follows:12
Round 1 Let m1 = m, M1 = M and W 1 = W . The top m1× q1 workers from M1 are
hired. Denoted those workers by A∗. Additionally, the top (1−m1) × q1
workers from W 1\A∗ are hired. Let M2 be the workers in M1 who were not
yet hired, and W 2 be the workers in W 1 who were not yet hired.
Round r ≥ 1 Let Ar = ϕSA (W, {q1, . . . , qr−1}) and mr = max
{
m− m(Ar)∑r
i=1 q
i , 0
}
. The
mr × qr top scoring minority workers in M r−1 are hired. Denote those
workers by A∗. Additionally, the top (1−mr)× qr workers from W r\A∗ are
hired. Let M r+1 be the workers in M r who were not yet hired, and W r+1
be the workers in W r who were not yet hired.
Differently from most previous rules, the sequential adjusted minority reserves adapts
the set of workers hired according to those who were hired in previous rounds. This
12For simplicity, the description below assumes that the number of workers inM andW is large enough
so that in every round there is a sufficient number of them to be hired. A more general description
can be found in the appendix.
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makes sense: if we do not take into account, for example, that after the last round the
number of minority workers greatly exceeded the minimum required, some high-scoring
non-minority workers may not be hired, leading to a violation of minority fairness. In
fact, the theorem below shows that this is the only way of achieving these objectives.
Theorem 1. The sequential adjusted minority reserves is the unique rule that is mi-
nority fair and respects minority rights.
Moreover, the sequential adjusted minority reserves is aggregation independent, mak-
ing it ideal for a sequential hiring from a pool of workers.
Proposition 5. The sequential adjusted minority reserves rule is aggregation indepen-
dent.
6. Multiple institutions
In many cases, a pool of workers is shared between multiple institutions or locations.
In the hiring process for the Brazilian federal police, for example, workers may be
allocated to different locations.13 In the selection process for the New Zealand police,
the candidate’s preference is also taken into account when deciding which district a
worker who will be hired from the pool will go to:
“The candidate pool is not a waiting list. The strongest candidates are
always chosen according to the needs and priorities of the districts. The
time it takes to get called up to college depends on your individual
strengths and the constabulary recruitment requirements in your pre-
ferred districts. (...) We will look to place you into your preferred district
but you may also be given the option to work in another district where
recruits are needed most.”14
In this section we evaluate how the fact that workers may be hired by more than
one institution affects the attainability of basic desirable properties. Now, in addition
to the set of workers W , there is a set of institutions I = {i1, . . . , i`}. Institutions
make sequences of hires, and there is no simultaneity in their hires: in each round
only one institution may hire workers. Therefore, when we describe a round we now
must determine not only how many workers are hired, but also which institution those
workers will be assigned to. Some additional notation will be necessary. A matching
µ is a function from I ∪W to subsets of I ∪W such that:
• µ (w) ∈ I ∪ {∅} and |µ (w)| = 1 for every worker i,15
• µ (i) ⊆ W for every institution i,
13Source: Brazilian Department of Federal Police.
14Source: New Zealand Police (https://www.newcops.co.nz/recruitment-process/candidate-pool), ac-
cessed in March 8th 2018.
15We abuse notation and consider µ (w) as an element of I, instead of a set with an element of I.
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• µ (w) = i if and only if w ∈ µ (i).
At the end of each round r ≥ 1, we define the matching of workers to institutions as
a function µr.
A sequence of hires is a list of pairs (i, q), where i is an institution and q is the
number of workers hired. A sequence of hires qrI = ((i1, 3) , (i3, 2) , (i1, 2)) , for example,
represents the case in which in the first round institution i1 hires three workers, in the
second round institution i3 hires two workers, and then in the third round institution i1
hires two workers. A rule ϕ therefore, can be generalized to produce matchings instead
of allocations. We will use the notation ϕi for the value of ϕ (·) (i). The example below
clarifies these points.
Example 6. Consider a set of workers W = {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5} with scores sW =
(100, 90, 80, 50, 20), a set of institutions I = {i1, i2, i3} and let ϕ be a rule that, in any
round, matches the highest scoring workers to the institution in that round. Then if
qrI = ((i1, 1) , (i3, 2) , (i1, 1)), the matchings µ1, µ2 and µ3 produced at the end of each
round are:
µ1 =
(
i1 i2 i3
w1 ∅ ∅
)
µ2 =
(
i1 i2 i3
w1 ∅ {w2, w3}
)
µ3 =
(
i1 i2 i3
{w1, w4} ∅ {w2, w3}
)
We will consider two properties for rules when there are multiple institutions. The
first is related to the desirability of workers.
Definition 5. A rule ϕ satisfies common top if there exists a worker w∗ ∈ W such
that, for every institution i ∈ I and q > 0, w∗ ∈ ϕi (W, (i, q)).
In words, common top requires that there is at least one worker that, whenever
available, all institutions would hire.
Next, we consider a weak notion of consistency across the hirings made by the insti-
tutions.
Definition 6. A rule ϕ satisfies permutation independence if for any sequence of
hires qrI and any permutation of its elements P (qrI),
⋃
i∈I ϕi (W, q
r
I) =
⋃
i∈I ϕi (W,P (q
r
I)).
Permutation independence, therefore, simply requires that the set of workers hired,
regardless of where, should not change if we adjust the order of hirings.
The family of rules that we will use in our next result is very simple but also very
restrictive. Let qrI be any sequence of hires. A rule ϕ is single priority if there exists
a strict ranking  of the workers in W such that when qrI is any sequence of hires,
ϕi (W, (q
r
I , (i, q))) = ϕi (W, q
r
I) ∪
q
max

W\ϕi (W, qrI)
Where maxqX is the set with the top q elements of X with respect to the ordering .
In words, a rule is single priority if all hirings from all institutions consist of hiring the
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top workers, among the remaining ones, when all of these institutions share a common
ranking.
The result below shows that, for a wide range of applications, having multiple insti-
tutions is incompatible with most objectives a policymaker may have.
Theorem 2. A rule satisfies common top, aggregation independence and permutation
independence if and only if it is a single priority rule.
Theorem 2 is fundamentally a negative result. It implies that, for the most part,
distributional objectives, such as affirmative action, though very common in practice,
are unattainable unless we give up on this reasonably weak concept of independence.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we evaluate a hiring method that is widely used around the world,
especially for public sector jobs, where institutions select their workers over time from
a pool of eligible workers. While the simple and natural rule of sequential priority
satisfies all desirable characteristics, the addition of compositional objectives such as
affirmative action policies increases the complexity of the procedures. In fact, we show
that the rules being used in practical hiring processes, as well as the direct application
of minority reserves, fail fairness or aggregation independence. When the compositional
objectives can be modeled as affirmative action for minorities, the sequential adjusted
minority reserves, which we introduced, is therefore the unique solution that satisfies
those desirable properties.
If multiple institutions hire from the same pool of applicants, however, we show that
the space for compositional objectives, or even distinct hiring criteria between institu-
tions, is highly restricted when a minimal requirement of independence is imposed.
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Appendix
Formal descriptions of the rules.
Sequential Priority (SP rule).
For each (W,A, {q1, . . . qr}), each round a ≤ r, the highest scoring workers
are selected.
Round 1: Let W1 = W and.M1 = M ∩W1. The highest scoring q1
workers in W1 are selected. Let A1, be the set of selected workers, where
for each w ∈ A1 and each w′ ∈ W1 \A1 we have sw > sw′ , and |A1| = q1.
Round k = 2,3, . . . , r: Let Wk = Wk−1 \ Ak−1 and Mk = M ∩Wk.
The highest scoring qk workers in Wk are selected. Let Ak be the set of
selected workers, where for each w ∈ Ak and each w′ ∈ Wk \ Ak we have
sw > sw′ , and |Ak| = qk.
The assignment selected by SP rule is
ϕSP (W, {q1, . . . , qr}) =
⋃
a≤r
Aa.
Sequential Adjusted Minority Reserves (SAM rule).
For each (W,A, {q1, . . . qr}), we have the following two steps
Round 1:
Step 1.1: Let W1,1 = W , M1,1 = M ∩W1,1 and q1,1 = dm× q1e. The
highest scoring min{q1,1, |M1,1|} minority workers in W1,1 are selected.
Let A1,1 be the set of selected workers, where A1,1 ⊆ M1,1. For each
w ∈ A1,1 and each w′ ∈ M1,1 \ A1,1, we have sw > sw′ , and |A1,1| =
min{q1,1, |M1,1|}.
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Step 1.2: LetW1,2 = W1,1\A1,1,M1,2 = M∩W1,2 and q1,2 = q1−|A1,1|.
The highest scoring q1,2 workers in W1,2 are selected. Let A1,2 be the set
of selected workers, where for each w ∈ A1,2 and each w′ ∈ W1,2 \A1,2 we
have sw > sw′ , and |A1,2| = q1,2.
Round k = 2,3, . . . , r:
Step k.1: LetWk,1 = Wk−1,2\Ak−1,2,Mk,1 = M∩(Wk−1,2\Ak−1,2) and
qk,1 = dmin{max{m − m(A1,2)+...+m(Ak−1,2)qk , 0} × qk, |Mk,1|}e. The highest
scoring qk,1 minority workers in Wk,1 are selected. Let Ak,1 be the set
of selected workers, where Ak,1 ⊆ Mk,1, for each w ∈ Ak,1 and each
w′ ∈Mk,1 \ Ak,1 we have sw > sw′ , and |Ak,1| = qk,1.
Step k.2: LetWk,2 = Wk,1\Ak,1,Mk,2 = M∩Wk,2 and qk,2 = qk−|Ak,1|.
The highest scoring qk,2 workers are selected from Wk,2. Let Ak,2 be the
set of selected workers, where for each w ∈ Ak,2 and each w′ ∈ Wk,2 \Ak,2
we have sw > sw′ , and |Ak,2| = qk,2.
The assignment selected by the SAM rule is
ϕSAM(W,A, {q1, . . . , qr}) =
⋃
a≤r
i∈{1,2}
Aia.
Sequential use of minority reserves (SM rule).
Within each round a ≤ r we have two steps.
Round 1:
Step 1.1: Let W1,1 = W , M1,1 = M ∩W1,1 and q1,1 = dm× q1e. The
highest scoring min{q1,1, |M1,1|} minority workers are selected. Let A1,1
be the set of selected workers, where A1,1 ⊆M1,1. For each w ∈ A1,1 and
each w′ ∈ W1,1 \ A1,1 we have sw > sw′ , and |A1,1| = min{q1,1, |M1,1|}.
Step 1.2: Let W1,2 = W \A1,1, M1,2 = M ∩W1,2 and q1,2 = q1−|A1,1|.
The highest scoring q1,2 workers are selected. Let A1,2 be the set of
selected workers, where for each w ∈ A1,2 and each w′ ∈ W1,2 \ A1,2 we
have sw > sw′ , and |A1,2| = q1,2.
Round k = 2,3, . . . , r:
Step k.1: LetWk,1 = Wk−1,2\Ak−1,2,Mk,1 = M∩(Wk−1,2\Ak−1,2) and
qk,1 = dm × qke. The highest scoring min{qk,1, |Mk,1|} minority workers
are selected. Let Ak,1 be the set of selected workers, where Ak,1 ⊆ Mk,1.
For each w ∈ Ak,1 and each w′ ∈ Wk,1 \ Ak,1 we have sw > sw′ , and
|Ak,1| = min{qk,1, |Mk,1|}.
Step k.2: LetWk,2 = W \Ak,1,Mk,2 = M ∩Wk,2 and qk,2 = qk−|Ak,1|.
The highest scoring qk,2 workers are selected. Let Ak,2 be the set of
selected workers, where for each w ∈ Ak,2 and each w′ ∈ Wk,2 \ Ak,2 we
have sw > sw′ , and |Ak,2| = qk,2.
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The assignment produced by the SM rule is ϕSM(W, qr, r) =
⋃
a≤r
i∈{1,2}
Aa,i.
Brazilian assignment rule (B rule).
Let pi = (W,M, sW , qr, r) be a problem. The rule identifies a large number
k (which is larger than the total number of vacancies to be filled). Then
two groups are identified: (i) the top k×m minority workers: TM ⊆M
with |TM | = dk×me such that for each w ∈ TM and each w′ ∈M \TM ,
we have sw > sw′ and (ii) the top k(1 − m) workers among those who
were not chosen in (i), that is: O ⊆ W \ TM such that |O| = bk(1−m)c
and for each w ∈ O andw′ ∈ W \ (O ∪ TM), we have sw > sw′ . Within
each round a ≤ r, we have two steps.
Round 1:
Step 1.1: Let O1,1 = O, TM1,1 = TM and q1,1 = dm× q1e. The high-
est scoring min{q1,1, |TM1,1|} minority workers are selected from TM1,1.
LetA1,1 be the set of selected workers, where A1,1 ⊆ TM1,1. For each
w ∈ A1,1 and each w′ ∈ TM1,1 \ A1,1 we have sw > sw′ , and |A1,1| =
min{q1,1, |TM1,1|}.
Step 1.2: Let O1,2 = O1,1, TM1,2 = TM \ A1,1 and q1,2 = q1 − |A1,1|.
The highest scoring q1,2 workers are selected from O1,2. Let A1,2 be the
set of selected workers, where for each w ∈ A1,2 and each w′ ∈ O1,2 \A1,2
we have sw > sw′ , and |A1,2| = q1,2.
Roundk = 2,3, . . . , r:
Step k.1: Let Ok,1 = Ok−1,2\Ak−1,2, TMk,1 = TMk−1,2 and qk,1 = dm×
qke. The highest scoring min{qk,1, |TMk,1|} minority workers are selected
from TMk,1. Let Ak,1 be the set of selected workers, where Ak,1 ⊆ TMk,1.
For each w ∈ Ak,1 and each w′ ∈ TMk,1 \ Ak,1 we have sw > sw′ , and
|Ak,1| = min{qk,1, |TMk,1|}.
Step k.2: Let Ok,2 = Ok,1, TMk,2 = TM \ Ak,1 and qk,2 = qk − |Ak,1|.
The highest scoring qk,2 workers are selected from Ok,2. LetAk,2 be the
set of selected workers, where for each w ∈ Ak,2 and each w′ ∈ Ok,2 \Ak,2
we have sw > sw′ , and |Ak,2| = qk,2.
The assignment produced by the B rule is ϕB(W, qr) =
⋃
a≤r
i∈{1,2}
Aa,i.
French assignment rule (F rule).
Let m be the target ratio of people with disabilities.
Round 1:
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Policy 1: Let W1,1 = W , M1,1 = M ∩ W1,1. The highest scoring
min{q1,1, |W1,1|} workers, with respect to sOW , are selected from W1,1. Let
A1,1 be the set of selected workers, where A1,1 ⊆ W1,1.
Policy 2: Let W1,1 = W , M1,1 = M . The highest scoring min{b(1 −
m) × q1,1c, |M1,1|} workers, with respect to sDW , are selected from M1,1.
Let A1,1 be the set of workers selected in this step. Then, the highest
scoring min{dm × q1,1e, |W1,1 \ A1,1|} workers, with respect to sOW , are
selected from W1,1 \ A1,1. Let A1,2 be the set of selected workers in this
step, and let A1 = A1,1 ∪ A1,2.
Round k = 2,3, . . . , r:
Step k.1: Let Wk,1 = Wk−1,2 \ Ak−1,2, TAk,1 =
⋃k−1
i=1 Ai. Let qk,1 =
min
{
max
{
m×
(∑k
i=1 qi
)
−m (TAk,1) , 0
}
, |Mk,1|
}
. The highest scor-
ing qk,1 workers, with respect to sDW , are selected from Mk,1. Let Ak,1 be
the set of workers selected in this step.
Step k.2: Let Wk,2 = Wk,1 \ Ak,1, and qk,2 = qk − |Ak,1|. The highest
scoring qk,2 workers, with respect to sOW , are selected from Wk,2. Let Ak,2
be the set of selected workers, Ak = Ak,1∪Ak,2 and TAk,2 = TAk,1∪Ak,2.
The assignment produced by the F rule is ϕF (W, qr, r) =
⋃
a≤r
i∈{1,2}
Aa,i.
Proofs.
Proposition 1. Let W ∗ = {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5} with scores sW = (50, 40, 30, 20, 10). For
simplicity we will use m = 0.5.
Consider first the caseM∗ = {w3, w4}. If q = 2, ϕF1({W ∗,M∗} , q) = {w1, w2}, which
fails to satisfy minority rights.
Consider now the case M∗ = {w4, w5}. Consider two possibilities: q1 = q2 = 2
and q = 4. Then ϕF1 ({W ∗,M∗} , {q1, q2}) = {w1, w2, w4, w5} but ϕF1 ({W ∗,M∗} , q) =
{w1, w2, w3, w4}, a violation of aggregation independence.
It is easy to see that the rule that results from policy 2, under the given assumptions,
is equivalent to the sequential adjusted minority reserves rule. Therefore, Policy 2 of
the French assignment rule respects minority rights, is aggregation independent, and is
minority fair.
Proposition 2. We will show that the Brazilian rule respects minority rights and is
aggregation independent, but fails to be minority fair.
By assumption, no more than k workers may be hired in total. Therefore, for
any q workers to be hired in any given round there should be at least dq × me mi-
nority workers in TM and q − dq × me workers in O. As a result, the Brazilian
rule acts as two parallel sequential priority rules: one in TM and one in O. There-
fore, the combination of both is evidently aggregation independent. Next, notice that
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again because of the assumption on the value of k, |M | ≥ m ×∑ti=1 qi. Moreover,
since for any q ∈ q1, . . . , qt there are at least dq × me minority workers in TM ,
m (ϕ (W, {q1, . . . , qt})) ≥ m×
∑
qi and by assumption on k, |ϕ (W, {q1, . . . , qt})| =
∑
qi
therefore m (ϕ (W, {q1, . . . , qt})) / |ϕ (W, {q1, . . . , qt})| ≥ m, implying that the Brazilian
rule respects minority rights. Finally, example 2 shows that the rule is not minority
fair.
Proposition 3. Example 3 shows that the NSW rule is neither fair nor minority fair.
Moreover, since for our results we assume that the number of men and women are always
large enough, the NSW consists of two parallel sequential priority hirings (one for male,
the other for female workers), and therefore satisfies aggregation independence. Finally,
it respects minority rights, since the number of male and female workers hired is always
the same.
Proposition 4. Example 4 shows that the sequential use of minority reserves is neither
aggregation independent nor fair. To see that it respects minority rights, notice that
every time q workers are hired, at least m× q minority workers are among them. As
a result, a proportion of at least m of the workers hired, at any point, is in M and
therefore the rule respects minority rights.
Theorem 1. By definition, the SAM rule respects minority rights, as at step k.1 of each
round k, rule selects minority workers to satisfy the minimum requirement up to that
round. Note that when there are not enough minority workers, SAM selects all the
available minority workers.
Now, we show that the rule is minority fair.
Let A ≡ ϕSAM(W, {q1, . . . , qr}) be the selection made for the problem. We want to
show that (i) for each w,w′ ∈ W \M , if w ∈ A and w′ /∈ A, then sw > sw′ , (ii) for
each w,w′ ∈ M , if w ∈ A and w′ /∈ A, then sw > sw′ . (iii) for each w ∈ W \M and
w′ ∈ M , if sw < sw′ and w ∈ A, then w′ ∈ A, (iv) if there is w ∈ W \M and w′ ∈ M
with sw > sw′ , w /∈ A and w′ ∈ A, then m(A)/n(A) ≤ m.
First note that cases (i), (ii) and (iii) hold trivially as at step k.1 of each round k,
the rule selects the highest scoring workers in M , and in step k.2 it selects the highest
scoring workers.
Suppose, for contradiction, that there is w ∈ W \M and w′ ∈ M with sw > sw′ ,
w /∈ A and w′ ∈ A, but m(A)/n(A) > m. Note that w′ cannot be selected at step k.2 of
any round k, as w would have been selected as well. The only case in which candidate
w′ is selected is during step `.1 of some round `. Since sw > sw′ , w /∈ A and w′ ∈ A,
then |topq(W )∩M | < m×q, where q =
∑
a≤r qa.
16 Thus, at step r.1 of the last round r,
16That is, the only way to hire a minority worker with a lower score and not the non-minority with
a higher score, is to satisfy the minority requirements. As we mentioned earlier, worker w′ is hired
during step `.1 of some round `, where selection occurs among minorities only.
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a selection is made so that|(
⋃
a<r
i∈{1,2}
Aia) ∪ A1k| = m× q. Since |topq(W )∩M | < m× q, we
have A2r ∩M = ∅. Thus, we obtain A ∩M = m× q which contradicts our assumption.
Now, we prove equivalence.
Let A ≡ ϕSAM(W, {q1, . . . , qr}) and A′ = ϕ(W, qr, r). Suppose, for contradiction,
there is w ∈ A such that w /∈ A′. Since |A| = |A′|, there is w′ ∈ A′ such that w′ /∈ A.
We have several cases.
Case 1: w,w′ ∈W \M . If sw > sw′ , then since ϕ is minority fair, w′ ∈ A′ implies
that w ∈ A′ as well, which contradicts our assumption. If reversely, sw < sw′ , then
since SAM is minority fair, w ∈ A implies that w′ ∈ A as well, which contradicts our
assumption.
Case 2: w,w′ ∈ M . If sw > sw′ , then since ϕ is minority fair, w′ ∈ A′ implies
that w ∈ A′ as well, which contradicts our assumption. If reversely, sw < sw′ , then
since SAM is minority fair, w ∈ A implies that w′ ∈ A as well, which contradicts our
assumption.
Case 3: w′ ∈ W \M and w ∈ M . If sw > sw′ , then since ϕ is minority fair,
w′ ∈ A′ implies that w ∈ A′ as well, which contradicts our assumption. Suppose instead
that sw < sw′ . Since w ∈ A and w′ /∈ A we have either (i) |M | < dm × qe and thus
|M∩A| < dm×qe, where q = ∑a≤r qa, or (ii) |M | ≥ dm×qe and thus |M∩A| = dm×qe.
If we have (i), then since SAM respects minority rights, we have M ⊆ A, and since ϕ
also respects minority rights we have M ⊆ A′ which implies w ∈ A′, which contradicts
our assumption. Reversely, let (ii) be the case. Then since |M | ≥ dm× qe and since ϕ
respects minority rights, the fact that w /∈ A′ implies that there is w′′ ∈ A′ ∩M such
that w′′ /∈ A. Since w′′ /∈ A, the minority fairness of SAM implies that sw′′ < sw. Then,
by minority fairness of ϕ, the fact that w′′ ∈ A′ implies that w ∈ A′, which contradicts
our assumption.
Case 4: w ∈W \M and w′ ∈M . If sw′ > sw, then since SAM is minority fair,
w ∈ A implies that w′ ∈ A as well, which contradicts our assumption. Suppose sw > sw′ .
Since w′ ∈ A′ and w /∈ A′ we have either (i) |M | < dm×qe and thus |M∩A′| < dm×qe,
where q =
∑
a≤r qa, or (ii) |M | ≥ dm × qe and thus |M ∩ A′| = dm × qe. If we
have (i), then since ϕ respects minority rights we have M ⊆ A′, and since SAM also
respects minority rights we have M ⊆ A which implies w′ ∈ A, which contradicts
our assumption. Reversely, let (ii) be the case. Then, since |M | ≥ dm × qe and since
SAMrespects minority rights, minority fairness implies that |A∩M | = |A′∩M |. Then,
the fact that w′ /∈ A implies that there is w′′ ∈ A∩M such that w′′ /∈ A′. Since w′′ /∈ A′,
minority fairness of ϕ implies that sw′′ < sw′ . Then, by minority fairness of SAM , the
fact that w′′ ∈ A implies that w′ ∈ A, which contradicts our assumption.
Proposition 5. LetW be the set of workers. First, note that when |M | < dm×qe, M ⊂
ϕSAM(W, {q1, . . . , qr}) and M ⊂ ϕSAM(W,
∑r
i=1 qi). Since |ϕSAM(W, {q1, . . . , qr})| =
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|ϕSAM(W,∑ri=1 qi)| and SAM is minority fair, we have M ⊂ ϕSAM(W, {q1, . . . , qr})
and thus ϕSAM(W,M, sW , qr, r) = ϕSAM(W,
∑r
i=1 qi).
Now let |M | ≥ dm × qe. Suppose, for contradiction, ϕSAM(W,M, sW , qr, r) 6=
ϕSAM(W,
∑r
i=1 qi).
Let A′ = ϕSAM(W,M, sW , qr, r) =
⋃
a≤r
i∈{1,2}
Aia and A ≡ ϕSAM(W, q). Then there is
w ∈ A such that w /∈ A′. Since |A| = |A′|, there is w′ ∈ A′ such that w′ /∈ A.
Claim 1: Neither w,w′ ∈ W \M nor w,w′ ∈M holds.
Proof of the Claim 1: Suppose by contradiction that either w,w′ ∈ W \M or
w,w′ ∈M holds. We analyze both cases.
Case 1: Let w,w′ ∈ W \M . If sw > sw′ , then since SAM is minority fair w′ ∈ A′
implies that w ∈ A′ as well, which contradicts our assumption. If reversely, sw < sw′ ,
once again since SAM is minority fair, w ∈ A implies that w′ ∈ A as well, which
contradicts our assumption.
Case 2: Let w,w′ ∈ M . If sw > sw′ , then since SAM is minority fair, then w′ ∈ A′
implies that w ∈ A′ as well, which contradicts our assumption. If reversely, sw < sw′ ,
once again since SAM is minority fair, w ∈ A implies that w′ ∈ A as well, which
contradicts our assumption. 
Thus, under Claim 1 there is a minority worker w¯ ∈ M such that either (i) w¯ ∈ A′
and w¯ /∈ A or (ii) w¯ ∈ A and w¯ /∈ A′.
Observation 1: When |M | ≥ m×q, at each round k ≤ r, we have |(
⋃
a<k
i∈{1,2}
Aia) ∪ A1k| ≥ m×
∑
a≤k
qa.
That is, at any round k, at the end of the step 1, we have enough number selected work-
ers to satisfy the minority needs.
Next, we consider several cases,
Case 1: |topq(W ) ∩M | = m × q. That is, there is just enough minority workers
among top q highest scoring workers inW to satisfy the minority needs. Let topm×q(M)
be the set of those workers. By definition, A′ = topq(W ) and A′ ∩M = topm×q(M).
(i) Note that if there is w′ ∈ A′ ∩M such that w′ /∈ A ∩M , then either we have
|A∩M | < m× q which violates the fact that the SAM rule respects minority rights, or
we have |A ∩M | = m × q which implies there is w′′ ∈ A ∩M such that w′′ /∈ A ∩M ,
and since A′ ∩M = topm×q(M) we have sw′ > sw′′ which violates SAM being minority
fair.
(ii) If, on the other hand, there is w′ ∈ A ∩ M such that w′ /∈ A′ ∩ M , then
|A ∩M | > m × q = |A′ ∩M |. That is, there is a round k ≤ r and step i ∈ {1, 2}
during which this extra minority worker was taken. Note that w′ has a lower score than
any worker w′′ ∈ topm×q(M). Consider the second step of round r. By Observation
1, |(A \ A2r) ∩M | ≥ m × q. By definition of the SAM, worker w′ cannot be taken at
this step. Now consider the first step of round r. Once again, under Observation 1
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and the definition of SAM, either A1r = ∅ and|(A \ A2r) ∩M | ≥ m × q, or A1r 6= ∅, in
which case |(A \ A2r) ∩M | = m× q. If it is the second scenario then there is a worker
w¯ ∈ topm×q(M) such that w¯ /∈ A ∩M and the fact that w′ ∈ A ∩M together with
sw¯ > sw′ contradicts minority fairness. If, on the other hand, it is the first scenario,
then we consider the second step of round r − 1. We continue in the same way. Since
there are finite number of rounds and steps, there is a round k (simply consider round
1), where A1k 6= ∅ and|(
⋃
a<k
i∈{1,2}
Aia) ∪ A1k| = m×
∑
a≤k
qa. Thus, we obtain contradiction.
Hence, there is no w′ ∈ A ∩M that isw′ /∈ A′ ∩M . Case 2: |topq(W ) ∩M | < m × q.
By definition, A′ ∩M = topm×q(M).
(i) Note that if there is w′ ∈ A′ ∩M such that w′ /∈ A ∩M , then either we have
|A ∩M | < m × q which violates the fact that the rule respects minority rights, or we
have |A ∩M | = m× q which implies there is w′′ ∈ A ∩M such that w′′ /∈ A ∩M , and
since A′ ∩M = topm×q(M) we have sw′ > sw′′ which violates SAM being minority fair.
(ii) If, on the other hand, there is w′ ∈ A ∩ M such that w′ /∈ A′ ∩ M , then
|A ∩M | > m× q = |A′ ∩M |. That is, there is round k ≤ r and step i ∈ {1, 2} during
which this extra minority worker was taken. Consider the second step of round r. By
Observation 1, |(A \ A2r) ∩M | ≥ m × q. By definition of SAM, worker w′ cannot be
taken at this step. Note that w′ has lower score than any worker w′′ ∈ topm×q(M).
Now consider the first step of round r. Once again, under Observation 1 and the def-
inition of SAM, either A1r = ∅ and |(A \ A2r) ∩M | ≥ m × q, or A1r 6= ∅, in which case
|(A\A2r)∩M | = m×q. If it is the second scenario then there is a worker w¯ ∈ topm×q(M)
such that w¯ /∈ A ∩M and the fact that w′ ∈ A ∩M together with sw¯ > sw′ contra-
dicts minority fairness. If, on the other hand, it is the first scenario, then we consider
second step of round r − 1. We continue in the same way. Since there are finite num-
ber of rounds and steps, there is a round k (simply consider round 1), where A1k 6= ∅
and |(
⋃
a<k
i∈{1,2}
Aia) ∪ A1k| = m×
∑
a≤k
qa. Thus, we obtain contradiction. Hence, there is no
w′ ∈ A ∩M that is w′ /∈ A′ ∩M .
Case 3: |topq(W ) ∩M | > m × q. That is, there are more than enough minority
workers among the top q highest scoring workers in W to satisfy minority needs. Let
topq(W ) ∩M be the set of those workers. By definition, A′ = topq(W ).
(i) Suppose there is a worker w′ ∈ A′ ∩M such that w′ /∈ A ∩M . That is, there
is a worker w′′ ∈ topq(W ) such that w′′ /∈ A. Then there is a worker w¯ /∈ topq(W )
butw¯ ∈ A. This contradicts the fact that SAM is minority fair, since sw′′ > sw¯ and
w′′ /∈ A but w¯ ∈ A.
(ii) On the other hand, suppose there is w′ ∈ A∩M such that w′ /∈ A′∩M . Note that
w′ /∈ topq(W ). That is, there is round k ≤ r and step i ∈ {1, 2} during which this extra
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minority worker was taken. Consider the second step of round r. Under Observation
1, |(A \ A2r) ∩M | ≥ m × q. By definition of SAM, worker w′ cannot be taken at this
step. Now consider the first step of round r. Once again, under Observation 1 and
the definition of SAM, either A1r = ∅ and |(A \ A2r) ∩ M | ≥ m × q, or A1r 6= ∅, in
which case |(A \ A2r) ∩M | = m× q. If it is the second scenario then there is a worker
w¯ ∈ topm×q(M) such that w¯ /∈ A ∩M and the fact that w′ ∈ A ∩M together with
sw¯ > sw′ contradicts minority fairness. If, on the other hand, it is the first scenario,
then we consider second step of round r − 1. We continue in the same way. Since
there are finite number of rounds and steps, there is a round k (simply consider round
1), where A1k 6= ∅ and |(
⋃
a<k
i∈{1,2}
Aia) ∪ A1k| = m×
∑
a≤k
qa. Thus, we obtain contradiction.
Hence, there is no w′ ∈ A ∩M that is w′ /∈ A′ ∩M .
Theorem 2. The single priority rule satisfying common top, aggregation independence
and permutation independence is very easy to see. Now suppose that there is a set
of workers W and a rule ϕ∗ that satisfies common top and permutation independence.
Denote by w∗ the common top worker. We first show by induction in the number of
hires that there is an ordering of workers (w∗, w2, w3, . . .) such that for any sequence
of single hires, that is, the hiring of one worker at a time, ϕ∗ will consist of a single
priority with that ordering. The induction base comes from the property of common
top: For any institution i, if qrI = ((i, 1)) then ϕ∗i (W, qrI) = w∗ . Next, by induction
assumption, for any sequence of k − 1 hires, in the first round the institution hires w∗,
in the second round the next (possibly the same) institution hires w2, etc. Now, for the
sake of contradiction, assume that the rule is not a single priority rule, and without loss
of generality, that the kth round is the first in which the rule does not hire following a
single priority. That is, if the kth hiring is made by institution i the worker hired will
be w, and if made by i′, the worker will be w′ 6= w.
By induction assumption, in the sequence of hires ((i1, 1) , (i2, 1) , . . . , (ik−2, 1) , ({i, i′}, 1))
, the set of workers hired is independent of whether the last hire was made by the last
institution i or i′ . By permutation independence, the set of workers hired after se-
quences ((i1, 1) , (i2, 1) , . . . , (ik−2, 1) , (i, 1) , (i′, 1)) is the same that is hired under the
permutation ((i1, 1) , (i2, 1) , . . . , (ik−2, 1) , (i′, 1) , (i, 1)). By contradiction assumption,
we assumed that the last hire in the first case was w′ and in the second w. Since the
overall set of workers hired remains the same, it must be that the set of workers hired
after the sequence ((i1, 1) , (i2, 1) , . . . , (ik−2, 1) , (i, 1)) contains w and not w′, and after
the sequence ((i1, 1) , (i2, 1) , . . . , (ik−2, 1) , (i′, 1)) it contains w′ and not w. This is a
contradiction with the induction assumption.
We have shown, therefore, that when considering single hirings, any rule that satisfies
common top and permutation independence is single priority. Finally, consider any se-
quence of hires ((i1, q1) , (i2, q2) , . . . , (ik, qk)). Since the rule is aggregation independent,
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the q1 workers hired in the first round are the same as those hired in q1 rounds, one by
one:
ϕ∗i1 (W, ((i1, q1))) = ϕ
∗
i1
W,
(i1, 1) , (i1, 1) , . . . , (i1, 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
q1 times

Similarly, aggregation independence implies that all subsequent hires can be split into
sequences of single hires, without changing the set of workers hired. Therefore, any
rule satisfying common top, aggregation independence and permutation independence
is single priority.
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